Monthly Archive for July, 2008

Registrars - Religious Discrimination claim

***EDIT - I’ve now been pointed towards the full judgment, available here. So much of what appears below can be disregarded! Please read the the new post here!***

Thanks to Family Lore for noticing that Christian marriage registrar Lillian Ladele has won her religious discrimination claim following her refusal to perform civil partnerships. As usual with legal stories the mainstream reporting is fairly shoddy, after reading the BBC article I couldn’t be sure if she’d only won on harassment (not big news) or she’d won on in/direct discrimation (big news). Oddly enough the Telegraph seems to be the only source I can find at the moment with any detail. Story here, and the only report of reasons is:

The panel said: “Islington Council rightly considered the importance of the right of the gay community not to be discriminated against but did not consider the right of Miss Ladele as a member of a religious group.

“It decided that the service it provided was secular and that the rights of the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual community must be protected.

“In so acting, Islington Council took no notice of the rights of Miss Ladele by virtue of her orthodox Christian beliefs.”

The tribunal said the council’s failure to take her concerns seriously and the decision to give her an ultimatum between her faith and her £31,000-a-year job was “a violation of Miss Ladele’s dignity and created an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment”.

It also noted that the council had admitted they could provide a “first class service” without Miss Ladele carrying out civil partnership ceremonies and that she had a good work record when dealing with gay men and women.

Legally, this is not particularly illuminating. We don’t have the facts they found, we don’t have the legal arguments they accepted and applied.

Looks like this particular one will have to await the EAT - but it’s an interesting contrast with the Christian magistrate. Sadly the discussion in that case - McClintock - is confined to judges, which perform a very different task to that of a registrar. There is some useful guidance however:

  • Direct discrimination: In McClintock it was held that direct discrimination could not succeed, as the DCA would have treated any of its magistrates the same as it did him. The same is likely to be true of Ladele.
  • Indirect discrimination: The blanket requirement on magistrates to adhere to the judicial oath was held to be justified. Would that work with registrars? There’s a clear parallel between magistrates picking and choosing cases (and in McClintock’s favour don’t forget that’s what he wanted to do, he didn’t say he should be allowed to apply his religious views to the cases he heard). A registrar’s function is somewhat less vested with responsibility than a magistrate, but is akin to a judicial function. I believe that the issue will be a delicate one, but would be surprised if no justification were found.
  • Harassment - if she was subjected to bullying due to her religion, then clearly it’s open to the tribunal to find harassment. What I believe she can’t do is simply refer to the management instruction to perform all ceremonies as harassment.

Anyway, ultimately we don’t know why she won yet, or even if she did on all points.

Any human rights arguments in McClintock were quashed by reference to the judgment of the House of Lords in Begum v Denbigh High School. I have no idea whether human rights have been raised by Ladele, but I think she’ll fail. Lord Bingham at para 23 (I’ve trimmed it down a bit):

The Strasbourg institutions have not been at all ready to find an interference with the right to manifest religious belief in practice or observance where a person has voluntarily accepted an employment or role which does not accommodate that practice or observance and there are other means open to the person to practise or observe his or her religion without undue hardship or inconvenience. Thus in X v Denmark (1976) 5 DR 157 a clergyman was held to have accepted the discipline of his church when he took employment, and his right to leave the church guaranteed his freedom of religion. His claim under article 9 failed. In Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v Denmark (1976) 1 EHRR 711, paras 54 and 57, parents’ philosophical and religious objections to sex education in state schools was rejected on the ground that they could send their children to state schools or educate them at home. The applicant’s article 9 claim in Ahmad, above, paras 13, 14 and 15, failed because he had accepted a contract which did not provide for him to absent himself from his teaching duties to attend prayers, he had not brought his religious requirements to the employer’s notice when seeking employment and he was at all times free to seek other employment which would accommodate his religious observance. … In rejecting the applicant’s claim in Konttinen v Finland (1996) 87-A DR 68 the Commission pointed out, in para 1, page 75, that he had not been pressured to change his religious views or prevented from manifesting his religion or belief; having found that his working hours conflicted with his religious convictions, he was free to relinquish his post. … In Stedman v United Kingdom (1997) 23 EHRR CD 168 it was fatal to the applicant’s article 9 claim that she was free to resign rather than work on Sundays. The applicant in Kalaç, above, paras 28-29, failed because he had, in choosing a military career, accepted of his own accord a system of military discipline that by its nature implied the possibility of special limitations on certain rights and freedoms, and he had been able to fulfil the ordinary obligations of Muslim belief…

For what my opinions are worth, it’s interesting that Ladele raised as part of her evidence for harassment that her behaviour had been compared by colleagues to a registrar refusing to marry a black person, and that she was called homophobic. Presumably she actually means refusing to marry a different race couple, but if a person’s genuine religious or philosophical beliefs dictated against a ‘mixing of the races’ - as is conceivable - then their case would be on all fours with hers. Calling that person a racist would be uncontroversial. Labelling Ladele homophobic is simply being descriptive; her tribunal case depends on her disapproval and dislike of gay relationships.

No legal advice privilege for non-lawyers

I like to bang on about employment law provision by non-lawyers, and the case of Howes v. Hinckley & Bosworth Borough Council [2008] UKEAT brings up a problem that will no doubt be raised again as the range of providers grows.

In a nutshell, unless your legal advice is coming from a qualified and practising barrister or solicitor, it is not subject to legal advice privilege. It can be subject to litigation privilege. The difference is that litigation privilege only attaches to advice given in contemplation of litigation. In this case, advice on how to respond to a grievance was held not to be contemplation of litigation. Hinckley & Bosworth were lucky here - their employment consultant happened to be a solicitor and still had a practising certificate. He could easily not have done, and it would seem the advice would have been discloseable.

Hickley & Bosworth’s rather nice motto ‘Post Proelia Concordia’ - After the battle, harmony - must reflect the resultant atmosphere in their legal department.

Any ideas some might have that this is an insuperable block to new-style providers are probably ill-founded - given that the model of regulation will be along the lines of a qualified lawyer having supervision of legal services, I imagine this will likely be treated as the same as a firm of solicitors.

Compromise agreements - relevant adviser

Compromise agreements, which are a vital tool in dispute resolution, come with some sensible safeguards. To be valid in compromising employment rights they must be in writing, set out the claims which are being compromised, and the employee must have received advice on the agreement’s terms and effect. The advice must come from (presently) a solicitor, barrister, Legal Executive, TU rep or advice centre worker. The advisor must be insured for the advice, and be independent from the employer. The proposal is to extend this to CIPD members, or in other words, qualified HR professionals. This is interesting, as one immediately wonders when this is likely to happen in practice. Some solicitors (for whom this can be profitable work they want to protect) have sneered that this could perhaps be a Saturday job. In truth, this suggested change is to be lauded and is ahead of its time. It’s no coincidence that CIPD have pushed for this change soon after MoJ regulation effectively endorses non-lawyer Claimant representatives in the tribunal.

The long-term future of most employment law provision to Claimants is not through firms of solicitors, but instead (as I’ve blogged before) through multi-disciplinary teams owned more likely than not by insurance / bank backed teams. In organisations like this, a CIPD practitioner will frequently be indistinguishable from any other qualified representative. It’s an unpalatable truth for some, but is certainly the way forward, as anyone who has worked for the Croner / First Assist / Peninsula / Mentor type company can attest.

The full consultation document is here. It also covers some tribunal changes which I’ll blog about shortly.

Nothing stands still…

Reading John Hutton’s speech delivered just six weeks ago or so the following appears:

  • Prioritising more jobs over new laws
  • If not major new regulation, then what?
  • Government’s role is to facilitate … conversation - not always to mandate either side on what should be done
  • It is not possible to legislate prescriptively for everything
  • The agreement on Agency Workers marks the successful completion of perhaps one of our most important objectives - to create now for the UK the right framework of employment protection without compromising our essential labour market flexibility.

… you might be forgiven there wasn’t much new law heading our way. It’ll be interesting to see if this remains the case, since Union leaders regard that objective as far from complete. They’ll be campaigning on yet more rights for agency workers (the 12 week rule already being an uneasy compromise), sham self-employment and, I reckon, stronger laws on workplace consultation and union recognition / bargaining rights.

Normally they’d stand no chance, but with the Labour party being in the financial state it is they may feel like they have a bit more clout than normal.

Successful National Minimum Wage prosecution

David Jackson and Pauline Smout, butchers from Sheffield, are the first employers to be successfully prosecuted under s31(1) of the National Minimum Wage Act 1998 - which means that they refused or wilfully neglected to remunerate their workers. Previous prosecutions under the Act, but mainly in relation to failure to keep proper records.

Given that underpaid workers have a civil remedy in the tribunals, and that the NMW enforcement team are (so I hear) happy to deal with minor infringements without recourse to prosecutions, their conduct must have been brazen to get as far as this. The HMRC press release is here. Anyone else think that a combined fine of £800 is a bit on the light side? It may well be that when they’ve paid the arrears/compensation they’ve not much left in the pot to pay any larger fine anyway.

TUPE Service Provision Changes - ’split’ transfers

TUPE 2006 still hasn’t produced much caselaw on service provision changes, but one thorny point has been helped by the case of Kimberley Group Housing Ltd v. Hambley & Ors (UK) Ltd [2008] which deals with ’split’ service provision.

By way of reminder, the event that triggers a transfer under the service provision change provisions is when:

activities cease to be carried out by a contractor on a client’s behalf (whether or not those activities had previously been carried out by the client on his own behalf) and are carried out instead by another person on the client’s behalf

In this case the activities weren’t outsourced to just one successor, but two. So what happens to the jobs? The employment tribunal at first instance performed a strange exercise where they divided the contract between the two transferees.

In truth, a ’split’ transfer is a very similar problem to that quoted by opponents to service provision change transfers in the professional arena - sure, I do 70% for client A, but if I transfer to him then is it 70% of my job or 100% that goes? The only answer on a reading of the regulations can by that 100% goes, and Lady Smith applies the same principle to split transfers. The tribunal must analyse the facts to determine which of the transferees had received the majority of the activities to which the employees were assigned. That transferee is therefore the recipient of the employee’s principal activities and is thus the sole transferee.

The EAT also makes the valid point that this present case shouldn’t have caused so much of a headache, there is a line of authority deriving from ‘conventional’ transfers that some work performed for a third party won’t preclude an employee from belonging to the entity that transfers.

New hosting, new look

In my quest for continual self-improvement I’ve now moved this site onto its own server. What does this mean? Well, hopefully it’ll let me make this site what I want it to be - and you’ll see some exciting new changes in the coming weeks.

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