Costs in the Employment Tribunal

Two recently reported decisions on costs Daleside Nursing Home Ltd v Mathew [2009] UKEAT and Verma v. Harrogate & District NHS Foundation Trust & Anor [2009] UKEAT. By way of reminder, the jurisdiction to order costs in the Tribunal arises in the following circumstances:

(i) the paying party has in bringing the proceedings, or he or his representative has in conducting the proceedings, acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably; or

(ii) the bringing or conducting of the proceedings by the paying party has been misconceived.

The above basis is only the first stage however, and the tribunal then has a discretion on whether or not to order costs. Certainly if (ii) applies there will still be no costs order in the vast majority of cases. Whilst an employment lawyer might look at an ET1 and ET3 and immediately assess the chances of the claim succeeding as low, the Tribunal will always have in mind that the Tribunal is intended to be both a costs free environment in the majority of cases, and also that it should provide  a suitable forum for litigants in person to have their complaints heard.

Mathew is an exception, and a rare case of the EAT overturning a Tribunal’s decision not to order costs against a Claimant following an unsuccessful claim. Mrs Mathew, facing a disciplinary, made an allegation that her manager had called her a ‘black bitch’, and claimed race discrimination. The Tribunal found

“We looked at all the surrounding circumstances and the background to this case and preferred Miss Rankin’s evidence over Mrs Mathew’s evidence. If the claimant had been called “a black bitch” she would not have waited for nearly three weeks to raise the issue and done so only because it looked as though she herself might be taken through a disciplinary process. She raised the issue on 6 June 2007 when she was resigning. Such a phrase is so offensive it is incomprehensible that she would not have made her objection much sooner. Mrs Mathew had no explanation for the delay.”

It then went on to order no costs due to it believing the Claimant to have a ‘genuine’ belief in her claim. This reason has no logic to it – if the phrase wasn’t said then Mrs Mathew made it up and lied about it. Where the central thrust of a claim is based on a lie, the EAT decided it was perverse not to order costs. Expect this case to be waved around by both sides in costs applications, as the Tribunal (like many courts) tries to deftly judge one side to be the winner without calling the other side a big fibber.

Verma confirms that it is acceptable to order costs on an unsuccessful strike-out application by a Respondent, and furthermore describes as ‘perverse’ the first-instance decision to allow counsel’s fee at the hearing but not the solicitors’ costs in preparing for it. The Employment Judge seems to have based his decision on the basis that the work done prior to the hearing would have happened in any event, which is clearly wrong. I have to say that I have myself seen parts of costs allowed and others excluded arbitrarily, and this decision does at any rate require Employment Judges to apply some reasoning to the costs orders they make.

Posted in Costs, Discrimination, Employment Tribunal, Remedies | Tagged | 1 Comment

The Rule of Law

Charon QC references an article in the Law Gazette talking of a speech given by Lord Phillips on the rule of law.

The rule of law is a concept poorly understood by most in our country, yet it underpins our constitution and civil liberties.

Please read Charon’s excellent post. Lord Phillips, of course, couldn’t help but refer back to Harriet Harman’s evocation of the dreaded Court of Public Opinion…

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When can the Tribunal order reinstatement or re-engagement?

Unfair dismissal law was originally written, and is still phrased, such that the primary remedy for unfair dismissal is an order for reinstatement or re-engagement, rather than compensation. They are however a minority, the vast majority of Claimant employees opting for the money instead.

Where they are of use to the employee is where they had long contracts with significant benefits, and where they would find re-employment difficult or impractical. Obviously these points can still be cured with money, but being put back into the same job (or one like it) is still a decision that some employees take.

An order for reinstatement puts the employee back in the same job from which he was dismissed, his original contract is revived and it is in effect as if the dismissal had never occurred.  Where this is impractical the tribunal can instead order re-engagement, where the employer must re-employ the employee on such terms as it thinks just. Therefore, if the circumstances of the dismissal had alienated the employee from his particular team, the tribunal could order appointment to a different position within the employer. ‘Re-employment’ is used as an umbrella term for both orders. An employer cannot be compelled to comply with a re-employment order, but if it does not comply then additional compensation will be awarded of between 26 and 52 weeks pay. Because of this, threats of applications for re-employment are used far more often than they are meant, in order to leverage larger settlement offers from employers who would rather cut off their own nose than re-employ someone they spent so much time and effort removing from the company.

In the recent EAT case of Central & North West London NHS Foundation Trust v Abimbola [2009] UKEAT HHJ Peter Clarke runs through what a tribunal must consider if it is asked for a re-employment order. The relevant law comes from s116 of the Employment Rights Act 1996:

116 Choice of order and its terms
(1)In exercising its discretion under section 113 the tribunal shall first consider whether to make an order for reinstatement and in so doing shall take into account-
(a)whether the complainant wishes to be reinstated,
(b)whether it is practicable for the employer to comply with an order for reinstatement, and
(c)where the complainant caused or contributed to some extent to the dismissal, whether it would be just to order his reinstatement.
(2)If the tribunal decides not to make an order for reinstatement it shall then consider whether to make an order for re-engagement and, if so, on what terms.
(3)In so doing the tribunal shall take into account-
(a)any wish expressed by the complainant as to the nature of the order to be made,
(b)whether it is practicable for the employer (or a successor or an associated employer) to comply with an order for re-engagement, and
(c)where the complainant caused or contributed to some extent to the dismissal, whether it would be just to order his re-engagement and (if so) on what terms.

This case was concerned with that practicality requirement. The Claimant, a psychiatric nurse, had been accused of holding a troublesome patient in a headlock. It was common ground that the Respondent NHS Trust had a genuine belief that the incident had occurred, and that dismissal was a reasonable response to that belief. The Tribunal found that the dismissal was unfair as the employer did not have reasonable grounds for that genuine belief. It also that there had been no contribution to the dismissal by the employee. It ordered reinstatement.

In short, the EAT overturned the reinstatement order because the genuine belief held by the employer as to the employee’s conduct rendered it impractical to put him in such a trustworthy post. The logic is that employment requires mutual trust and confidence and the employer simply could not repose such trust and confidence in the employee. In doing so it followed a previous similar decision in ILEA v Gravett [1988] IRLR 497.

One other item of note from this judgment is that the tribunal can take note of previous unproven allegations in determining the issue of trust and practicability, whereas these are usually disregarded for the purposes of the unfair dismissal itself.

Posted in Disciplinary, Employment Tribunal, Reinstatement & Re-engagement, Remedies | Tagged | 1 Comment

ELBA offer training over Skype

Those  barristers who aren’t already should join the Employment Law Bar Association. Their latest offering is a seminar on understanding tax in the context of Employment Law. That may or may not set your heart racing, but what will excite many is that the course is in Birmingham but you can join in remotely, and for free, over Skype. Now that’s about as free as CPD gets. Let’s hope that other courses put on by industry bodies (rather than private companies, who mastered this sort of thing ages ago) follow suit.

Posted in Lawyers | Tagged | Leave a comment

Increase in SRP weekly pay cap

Quick reminder on how Statutory Redundancy Pay is calculated. Take your employee’s weekly wage, then award:

  • 0.5 week’s pay for each full year of service where age during year less than 22
  • 1.0 week’s pay for each full year of service where age during year is 22 or above, but less than 41
  • 1.5 weeks’ pay for each full year of service where age during year is 41+.

However, there is a cap on the weekly wage that you use for the first part of the calculation. Presently it’s £350, which together with a cap of 20 years makes for a maximum statutory redundancy payment of £10,500. Although the figure increases by £10 or £20 each year, there have been rumblings that it ought to receive more than an inflationary adjustment. Sure enough, as has been widely reported, the chancellor has increased the figure to £380. Currently we don’t know when the change will apply (it requires secondary legislation), or if it will apply to the similar calculation of unfair dismissal basic award.

Watch this space.

(if you’re wondering why the figure has an effect on the budget, it’s because DBERR pick up the tab for insolvent employers who can’t pay the statutory redundancy payment to employees – which will be quite a few of them in the coming months)

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Daniel Barnett reaches milestone

Part of the lack of updates to this blog recently means I’m late reporting on a true employment law internet luminary reaching a real milestone. Daniel Barnett, barrister at 1 Temple Gardens, has been sending email employment law bulletins to just about everyone in the industry, from barristers to CIPD students, for ten years. And 1999 was a looong time ago in the IT world. Most of you, dear readers, may well not have even had an email address for him to write to.

To celebrate his anniversary Daniel launched a charity appeal to try to raise £10,000 for the Starlight Foundation. He’s achieved it in a very short space of time, but you can still donate at http://www.justgiving.com/danielbarnett2009.

Posted in Lawyers, Rambling, Usefully Employed | Tagged | Leave a comment

The truth on costs orders in the employment tribunal

The excellent Employment Tribunal Claims blog (which I shall now belatedly add to my blogroll), has performed some analysis on the frequency and amount of costs orders in the tribunals.

In summary, they report that the percentage of cases which proceed to a full hearing that result in a costs order against the Claimant is less than 1%, and that the majority of these are for figures significantly less than £1,000.

Have a read.

Of course, the statistic we can never know is in how many cases that proceed to a hearing is a warning on costs issued by the Respondent’s representative? Somewhat higher methinks…

If you are in person and on the receiving end of a letter warning you of a costs application, perhaps accompanied by some terrifying schedule, then treat it as a warning to do what you should be doing at all times – taking an objective look at your case to see if there is a prospect of success. If your claim is one that might succeed, and your conduct of the litigation has been reasonable, then the very broad view is that you don’t need to worry too much about costs.

Posted in Employment Tribunal | Tagged | 3 Comments

Employee suspended for disclosing anti-gay views in a conversation

The reason that the regulations concerning sexual orientation and religion and belief will cause so many thorny problems is that the latter may well protect opinions and points of views (what else is a religion or philosophical belief?) that are rather strongly against the practice and free expression of the former.

The Times reports that a worker at a Christian hostel in Southampton was asked his views on homosexuality in a conversation with a colleague. His reply, that he was opposed to same-sex marriages and to homosexual clergy but he was not homophobic and had homosexual friends, earned him a suspension for “promoting [his] religious views which contained discriminatory comments regarding a person’s sexual orientation. The action was apparently to “to safeguard both residents and staff”.

I suspect this case will make good news copy but not really any good law. The worker is prima facie entitled to hold his religious beliefs, but that right is subject to employer controls on dignity in the workplace and so on. If a gay employee was subjected to preaching on brimstone and hellfire without invitation or acquiescence, then he would likely have a complaint. If the conversation here was simply such that the worker was asked “What are your religious views on homosexuality?” and replied as reported, then it may well be that the complaint against him is weak, and does not justify something that may be indirect religious discrimination.

Cases such as these will be deeply fact sensitive. The best guidance for employers is that they need to foster an approach to their employees which values the right to hold a sexual orientation, and the right not to have to hide it under a bushel, but similarly respects the right to hold a religious view, while recognising that expression of some of its aspects may be justifiably restricted.

For the strength of religion in shaping behaviour, see this stunning  collection of photographs of Easter Week celebrations and observances around the world, from the usual crowds in Vatican City to bloody self-flagellation in the Philippines.

 

Boston.com - The Big Picture - Penitents take part in a procession of the Fusionadas brotherhood during Holy Week in the Andalusian city of Malaga, southern Spain April 8, 2009. (REUTERS/Jon Nazca) #

Boston.com - The Big Picture - Penitents take part in a procession of the "Fusionadas" brotherhood during Holy Week in the Andalusian city of Malaga, southern Spain April 8, 2009. (REUTERS/Jon Nazca) #

Boston.com – The Big Picture

 

And similarly, check out the oldest known depiction of a gay couple:

 

Khnumhotep and Niankhkhnum © 1999 Greg Reeder

Khnumhotep and Niankhkhnum © 1999 Greg Reeder

Khnumhotep and Niankhkhnum are shown here in the middle of a nose-rub, the most intimate gesture in Ancient Egyptian art. They were a couple, with a family, and lived in Egypt around 2400 BC.

Posted in Discrimination | 6 Comments

Imminent redesign of Usefully Employed

Following a period of shameful inactivity there will, by the end of this week, be a redesign of Usefully Employed – not necessarily aesthetic, but centred around content. Note that service may therefore be intermittent during this time.

What would you like to see on an employment law website like this one? Clearly there’s a limit to what I can produce, but I would like to have nutshell guides on the main areas of employment law, together with the current blog covering employment law news. Anything else?

Let me know by commenting here or by emailing me at webmaster [at] usefully employed [dot] co [dot] uk

Posted in Usefully Employed | Tagged | Leave a comment

Article 6 right to legal representation in disciplinaries

It’s a common request – “Can I bring a solicitor to my disciplinary?” – and a surprise to many employers that they have a right to refuse. There is a right under the Employment Relations Act 1999 to be accompanied at a grievance or disciplinary meeting by a fellow employee or a trade union representative. There is no right to be accompanied by a solicitor, and it’s easy to understand why. These meetings are internal, they are not concerned with deciding someone’s legal rights or making legal judgments. They are for the benefit of the employer in order that he can decide how to treat an employee, whether it’s a disciplinary sanction or the offering of some sort of satisfaction for their grievance.

Indeed, the language of Article 6 refers to ‘determination of civil rights and obligations’ when referring to the need for an impartial tribunal, and so on. Some new areas risk blurring the lines: there are now provisions for workers to be legally prevented for working with children, in schools, and with vulnerable adults where concerns over their behaviour has come to light. In this situation the effect of the disciplinary proceedings can be said to have consequences that go further than the relationship between the employer and employee. 

In the case of G, R (on the application of) v X School & Anor [2009] EWHC 504 (Admin), a teacher was accused of sexual impropriety with a 15 year old, involving a breach of trust. He was found by a disciplinary panel to have been in breach of trust, and the case referred to the Secretary of State to see if a direction should be made forbidding him from working in education. He was refused legal representation at the meeting. He challenged the validity of the meeting by judicial review, claiming that under Article 6 the proceedings were effectively criminal proceedings given the gravity of the allegations and the consequences of adverse findings. In the alternative, he claimed that even were the proceedings civil then they were of sufficient seriousness to require a right of legal represenation under article 6. The High Court found:

In my judgment, the gravity of the particular allegations made against the Claimant (sexual impropriety with a person under 18 and abuse of position of trust), taken together with the very serious impact upon the Claimant’s future working life of a potential s.142 direction, are such that he was, and is, entitled to legal representation at hearings before the Disciplinary Committee and the Appeal Committee. On such matters, the Claimant could not fairly be expected to represent himself, and being accompanied by a trade union official or a work colleague (even if available) was not sufficient.

It is important to realise that direct enforcement of human rights legislation, and judicial review proceedings at all for that matter, is only possible against public sector employers. Even so, this ruling opens the way for a considerable widening in what procedural safeguards must be put in place for more serious disciplinary cases.

Posted in Disciplinary, Dispute Resolution regulations, Employment Tribunal, Lawyers, Trade Unions, Unfair Dismissal | Tagged , | 1 Comment